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Damages in Wrongful Death Actions
Stanley B. Kent*
T IS AN ANCIENT TRUTH that the tort law is amoral in the sense that
the degree of culpability of the defendant, assuming, of course, there
is any culpability at all, is not a factor in determining damages. Nowhere
is this better illustrated than in wrongful death cases where the jury
is admonished to fix damages solely on the basis of the "pecuniary
injury" that the survivors suffered as the result of the death.' Although
this instruction represents the application to death cases of the com-
pensation theory that is so familiar in ordinary injury cases, it seems
almost inhumane in the context of death.
As the measure of damages in wrongful death cases is fixed by
statute, only one variable exists: the definition of "pecuniary injury." It
should be noted parenthetically that inflation might be considered a
variable as well, but this is an extra-legal consideration and does not
alter the rule that the jury is required to follow. Has the definition of
"pecuniary injury" been liberalized over the years?
Before attempting to answer that question it is important to take
note that death cases fall into two different categories. There are those
cases in which the decedent was the breadwinner for the survivors.
Here the economic consequences of death are easy to discern and com-
paratively easy to calculate. As will be seen, methods and formulas
for calculation vary somewhat but, in the main, these cases present few
problems. Far more difficult are those cases in which the decedent was
partially or solely dependent on the survivors. Here the literal appli-
cation of the "pecuniary injury" formula might appear to deny recovery
altogether or, at the very least, to keep verdicts at a penurious level.
Considering first the situation in which the decedent was the de-
pendent of the survivors, it is instructive to analyze three cases which
span a period of 33 years, from 1923 to 1956. These cases make it evi-
dent that the interpretation of the statute is expanding and is infused
with a new spirit of liberalism, even though the courts continue to
adhere to the statute for determining damages-as indeed they must.
First in order is Kennedy, Admr. v. Byers, a 1923 wrongful death
case of a ten year old boy.2 The jury rendered judgment for the plaintiff
but in what amount we are not told. The statute then in force was Sec.
* Of the Ohio bar, member of the firm of Belkin, Barnett, Kent & Shapiro, of Cleve-
land, Ohio.
S".. . The jury may give such damages as it thinks proportioned to the pecuniary
injury resulting from such death to the persons, respectively, for whose benefit the
action was brought ... " Ohio Rev. Code, § 2125.02. See, Oleck, Cases on Damages,
c. 22 (1962).
2 107 Ohio St. 90, 140 N.E. 630 (1923).
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10772 G. C., precursor of Sec. 2125.02, Ohio Revised Code and sub-
stantially the same in its wording. The judgment was reversed on ap-
peal because the trial court instructed the jury that it could "take into
account any pecuniary injury from loss of society, comfort and pro-
tection. . . ." 3 The Supreme Court quoted with approval the definition
of "pecuniary loss" that is found in Bouvier's Law Dictionary: "A loss
of money, or something by which money or something of value may be
acquired." 4 So erroneous was the instruction to the jury, the court
said, that
S. .. affirmance of this judgment would approve and sanction
a radical departure from the rule of damages prescribed by statute,
as interpreted and applied by our courts for many years, and
might well be regarded as authority by trial courts to go still
farther, and also suggest to juries that they might take into con-
sideration many other such elements as mental pain and suffering,
or sorrow, bereavement or distress of the beneficiaries." 5
Repelled as one might be by the seeming inhumanity of this de-
cision, it is nevertheless difficult to quarrel with it in the light of the
statute. The fact is that the death of a ten year old is a financial gain
to a family, not a loss. One might speculate that as an adult he would
dutifully contribute to the support of his parents in their declining years,
but speculation it would surely be and therefore not properly considered
by the jury. Moreover, sorrow and bereavement have never been
deemed to be measurable in money, although one might inquire why
they are any less susceptible to measurement than physical pain and
suffering in injury cases.
The plaintiff in this case made a rather ingenious argument based
on one of the 1912 amendments to the Ohio Constitution. Before 1912,
Ohio, like most states, had a specific dollar limit on the amount recover-
able in wrongful death cases. That limit had been $20,000.00, but the
1912 amendment forbade the legislature from enacting any ceiling on
damages.' This being so, the plaintiff in the Kennedy case argued, juries
are no longer circumscribed in their calculation of damages. The court's
answer was that the Constitutional change had no such broad effect; it
removed the dollar limit from verdicts, but in no sense did it alter the
basic prescription that only pecuniary injury may be considered in ar-
riving at verdicts. 7 The Kennedy case has never been expressly over-
ruled, and yet, as later cases make clear, its narrow interpretation of
pecuniary injury belongs to a parsimonious past.
3 Id. at 91, 140 N.E. at 631.
4 Id. at 92, 140 N.E. at 632.
5 Id. at 99, 140 N.E. at 639.
6 "The amount of damages recoverable by civil action in the courts for death caused
by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another, shall not be limited by law."
Ohio Const., Art. I, § 19a.
7 Kennedy, Admr. v. Byers, supra note 2 at 96.
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In the 1950 case of Immel, Adm'r. v. Richards,8 the Kennedy case
was cited, but, significantly, in the dissenting opinion; the majority
opinion does not refer to it at all. The decedent in Immel was a nine
month old infant, the liability was apparently undisputed, and the jury
returned a $5,000.00 verdict. It is important to note that after the jury
had commenced its deliberations, it submitted two written questions to
the trial judge. The first question concerned the defendant's insurance
coverage; the Court, of course, admonished the jury that it was not to
concern itself with insurance at all. The second question asked what
portion of the medical or funeral expenses the defendant had paid or
offered to pay; the Court answered that as no evidence had been of-
fered on the subject of medical and funeral expenses, this matter, too,
was not to be considered. After receiving these answers which, to a
lay jury, were probably somewhat mystifying, the $5,000.00 verdict
was agreed to and judgment duly entered.
Four of the seven judges of the Supreme Court sustained the
verdict, one dissented on the ground that the record clearly indicated
a verdict based on the supposed amount of casualty insurance rather than
on pecuniary injury, and two dissented because they felt the sum
awarded was simply excessive.
The majority opinion observed at the outset that the Court had
never made an authoritative statement about damages in infant death
cases. To fill this gap the court cited passages from a number of text
writers, cases from foreign jurisdictions, and two Ohio cases, Ochsner,
Adm'r. v. Cincinnati Traction Company9 and Karr, Adm'r. v. Sixt.lo It
concluded, from these several sources, that there is a presumption of
pecuniary injury to those persons legally entitled to services, earnings,
or support from the decedent. It conceded that it would be impractical
to offer direct evidence of any specific loss occasioned by the death of a
child of such tender years; but, it argued, to hold that without such
proof the plaintiff could not recover at all would have the effect of
making the wrongful death statute nugatory in cases of this description.
This section of the opinion then concludes with the simple statement:
"We are of the opinion that by the death of this child the parents
sustained a pecuniary loss." 11
We encounter a reference to Kennedy in this case m Judge Taft's
rather sharply worded dissent. While admitting that the Kennedy doc-
trine is a "cold-blooded calculating measure of human life," 12 Judge
Taft reiterates its rule and then stated the familiar proposition that if
8 154 Ohio St. 52, 93 N.E. 2d 474 (1950).
9 107 Ohio St. 33 at 34, 140 N.E. 644 at 647 (1923).
10 146 Ohio St. 527, 67 N.E. 2d 331 at 332 (1946).
11 Immel, Adm'r. v. Richards, supra note 8 at 56, 93 N.E. 2d at 478.
12 Id. at 59, 93 N.E. 2d at 481.
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factors other than pecuniary loss are to be considered in wrongful death
cases, it is the General Assembly, not the Courts, that should so decree.
A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in the Immel
case reveals that the difference between them centers around the
character of the proof demanded to demonstrate pecuniary injury. The
majority opinion made due obeisance to the statute, but sustained the
verdict on the basis of a presumption; the dissenters considered the ver-
dict to be based on "conjecture, guess, random judgment, or sup-
position .... ,, 13 This case unmistakably stands for the principle that a
presumption of pecuniary loss will be acceptable and that a $5,000.00
verdict for the death of an infant is not excessive. It is a radical de-
parture from Kennedy, and has had a profound effect on later cases.
In Crider, Adm'r. v. Columbus Plastic Products, Inc.,14 the Immel case
was cited to sustain a verdict of $10,000.00 where the decedent was
an eleven year old boy. Three judges of the Court of Appeals concurred
with only the very briefest discussion of the defendant's claim of ex-
cessiveness. The opinion announced three principles: that, except in the
case of the death of the breadwinner, the verdict is always conjectural;
that the jury may give such damages as it may think proportioned to
the pecuniary injury; and that, absent evidence in the record of pas-
sion and prejudice, a reviewing court will not substitute its own specu-
lation for the opinion of the jury.
Although none of the opinions in this area touch upon the matter
directly, it must be evident that the value of money plays a crucial-
perhaps a decisive role-both in the escalation of damages awarded and
the willingness of trial and reviewing courts to uphold the verdicts.
The strictures of the statute notwithstanding, there would be something
inherently preposterous in a judicial system which regularly and rou-
tinely permits juries to award thousands of dollars for injuries tran-
siently and minimally disabling, and at the same time overthrow verdicts
when a human life is taken unless those verdicts are so small as to be
penurious. This, it is suggested, is a major, if unstated, reason for
tolerance of verdicts which a few decades ago would have been thought
vertiginously high.
In this same line of cases, but distinguishable from the preceding
three because a pecuniary loss was plainly proved, is Flory, Adm'r. vs.
N. Y. C. Rd. Co.1 5 The decedent, although only eighteen years of age,
was an accomplished watchmaker and operated a jewelry store. His
father, who had trained his son, ran a separate jewelry store but the
two establishments made their purchases together to obtain lower whole-
13 Id. at 62, 93 N.E. 2d at 484.
14 90 Ohio L. Abs. 605, 190 N.E. 2d 63 (1956).
15 170 Ohio St. 185, 163 N.E. 2d 902 (1959).
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sale prices and the father, at times, handled the overflow business from
his son's store. In the light of such evidence, a verdict of $10,000.00 for
the son's wrongful death seems fully justified and was upheld.
This case, however, had a second feature to it. Before 1955, it
was not possible to join a cause of action for wrongful death and
another for personal injuries in the same petition. As damages for
wrongful death are claimed by the personal representative of the
estate and distributed to the next of kin in accordance with the dem-
onstrated pecuniary loss, such damages do not become a part of the
decedent's estate. 16 Contrariwise, damages awarded for personal in-
juries become assets of the estate so that distribution is determined either
by will or the laws of intestacy.17 This means that the plaintiffs are not
necessarily the same persons, or, at the very least, if those entitled to
inherit and the next of kin are identical, they make their claims in
separate and distinct legal capacities. Joinder of these two causes of
action is now permissible provided that both arise from the same
wrongful act."'
The Flory case 19 was decided after the date of the joinder statute.
In addition to the $10,000.00 verdict for wrongful death, the jury also
awarded $7500.00 for pain and suffering. Indeed, the opinions, both
majority and dissenting, were largely devoted to a discussion of the in-
jury aspect of the case. The decedent lived for ten hours after the col-
lision and the evidence was in some conflict as to his consciousness, and,
hence, his capacity to feel pain, during this time. The court, over a
vigorous dissent, found that there was sufficient credible evidence of
sensitivity to pain and upheld the verdict.
If some speculation may be permitted, is it possible that the Flory
jury, taking seriously the trial court's admonition that only pecuniary
injury was to be considered so far as wrongful death damages were
concerned, compensated for this limitation by awarding $7500.00 for
ten hours of pain and suffering? So far as this cause of action is con-
cerned, precise calibration of the pecuniary loss is not necessary. The
jury's latitude and discretion are almost unbounded. It is therefore ap-
parent that, in those cases in which there are two causes of action, juries
may administer a rough brand of justice. They can meticulously follow
the trial courts' instructions and award small sums for wrongful death
but, at the same time, salve their conscience with a generous award for
pain and suffering. Except in rare circumstances, the beneficiaries will
be the same persons. An examination of the reported cases, however,
16 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2125.03.
17 Ibid. § 2305.21; Adams, Adm'x. v. Malik, 106 Ohio App. 461, 155 N.E. 2d 237 (1957).
18 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2309.05 (K); Bell v. Cincinnati Transit Co., 108 Ohio App. 229,
9 Ohio Op. 2d 237, 155 N.E. 2d 698 (1958).
19 Flory, Adm'r. v. N.Y.C. R.R. Co., supra note 15.
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indicates that comparatively few wrongful death cases carry a personal
injury cause of action, so that this method of evading the dictates of the
statute is only occasionally available.
To what extent inflation influences a jury or a court in these cases
is hard to say. The effect may be subtle, even subliminal, but it is
certain to play some part in the deliberations and in the court's review
of the verdict. In the first decade or so of this century, verdicts of
$1,000.00 or less in cases of the wrongful death of minors were common-
place; 20 nor was it unheard of for a court to order substantial remit-
titurs when verdicts as low as $2500.00 were returned.2 1 To place such
meager value on the life of a minor today would be unthinkable and,
indeed, might be construed almost as an insult to the bereaving sur-
vivors. All that can be said with certainty is that a trend is discernible
in wrongful death cases where the decedent is not the financial main-
stay of the family, that its thrust is in the direction of larger verdicts,
and that they are more likely to be sustained when they are attacked
as excessive.
Discussion of damage trends in wrongful death cases where the
decedent is the breadwinner has been reserved until this point, but cer-
tainly not because these cases are considered of less importance. On
the contrary, when the survivors are dependent on the labor of the
decedent for their very sustenance, it becomes unnecessary to resort to
presumptions or to fanciful interpretations of pecuniary injury. A few
figures and the multiplication tables vividly demonstrate how acute is
the injury suffered by the survivors. Trends in these cases closely
parallel those discernible in personal injury cases generally. Such ob-
vious factors as the soaring cost of living and the shrinkage of the dollar,
together with much higher average earnings, combine to influence
juries profoundly. Although a quarter of a million dollars still seems
an astronomical amount, a man 30 years of age with an annual income
of $10,000.00 will achieve those total earnings by the time he is 55.
Sustained earnings at high levels over such a period of time is today by
no means exceptional.
But for several obvious reasons $250,000.00 paid and received at
one time is not to be equated with the same sum earned over many
years. The death has removed from the family one of the persons who
would have himself consumed a part of the income. Also, evidence of
earnings usually comes in the form of gross figures which do not re-
flect the ordinary payroll deductions. Nor can the earning power of
money be disregarded; thus, $250,000.00 so conservatively invested that
20 Ashtabula Rapid Transit Co. v. Dagenbach, Adm'r, 11 Ohio C. Dec. 307 (1900),
aff'd 67 Ohio St. 512, 67 N.E. 1100; Toledo Ry. & Light Co. v. Wettstein, Adm'r, 14
Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 441, 33 Ohio C.C.R. 15 (1908), aff'd 79 Ohio St. 439, 87 N.E. 1142;
Becker v. Howanyecz, Adm'x, 18 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 19, 42 Ohio C.C.R. 561 (1910).
21 Campbell v. Tarr, Adm'x., 18 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 323, 43 Ohio C.C.R. 66 (1911).
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it will yield a 4 per cent return will produce $10,000.00 annually with
no incursion into the principal. Finally, wrongful death damages are
not subject to federal income taxes.
Recent Ohio cases take these various factors into consideration. Thus
in Bartlebaugh v. Penn. Rd. Co.,22 the verdict was $225,000.00 but the
Supreme Court ordered a remittitur of $75,000.00. Here the decedent
was 23 years old and his annual earnings about $2850.00. The opinion
did not specify the life expectancy figures offered in evidence but con-
cluded that a lump sum of $41,195.00 (calculated by some tables), or at
the very most $57,617.00 (by other tables) would be the sum necessary
to provide, for the life of the survivor, an annual sum equivalent to the
decedent's earnings. Even taking the larger figure, the Court concluded
there is still a difference of over $92,000.00 between the $150,000.00
award to which the verdict was reduced and the sum required to re-
produce the decedent's annual income. The Court, despite its remittitur,
evidently recognized other elements of loss not so easily calculable in
money. For if these meticulous actuarial computations satisfy the pe-
cuniary injury, what injury or loss is compensated for by the $92,000.00
excess? Incidentally, this 1948 case was the first one in the history of
the Supreme Court in which a modification of a judgment was ordered.
Somewhat less generous was the jury in Spence, Adm'x. v. Com-
mercial Motor Freight, Inc.23 Although the opinion yields few facts
about the decedent, we are told that his annual income was in excess
of $3,000.00. The award was $42,000.00, only about one-half of what
would have been required to furnish an equivalent life-time income for
the survivors.
The gap between gross and net income was the central point of
Bergfeld, Adm'x. v. New York, Chicago, and St. Louis Rd. Co.24 The
defendant attempted to cross-examine the plaintiff's actuary on the de-
ductions from his pay for railroad retirement and withholding taxes on
the ground that the decedent's widow, after all, lived on a percentage
of his take-home pay. 25 But plaintiff's objection to this line of cross-
examination was sustained. The court also refused to give defendant's
offered instruction to the jury that damages would be exempt from
federal income and estate taxes.20
This case followed Maus v. New York, Chicago, and St. Louis Rd.
Co.,27 which also upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury
on the tax exempt status of its award. But the Court said:
22 150 Ohio St. 387, 82 N.E. 2d 853 (1948).
23 99 Ohio App. 143, 127 N.E. 2d 427 (1954).
24 103 Ohio App. 87, 144 N.E. 2d 483 (1956).
25 Id. at 99, 144 N.E. 2d at 495.
26 Id. at 100, 144 N.E. 2d at 496.
27 165 Ohio St. 281, 135 N.E. 2d 253 (1956).
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"Perhaps it should be noted that this case does not present the ques-
tion as to what a trial judge's response should be if and when the
jury asks him whether it should consider the matter of income
taxes." 28
Also, three judges joined in a special concurrence saying that a charge
warning the jury not to consider income tax liability on the award it
might make would be acceptable.2 9 The refused charge in this case re-
quested the jury to take the fact of exemption in consideration in ar-
riving at the amount of its verdict.
If this verbiage can be untangled, it appears to say this: a court,
if asked to do so by counsel, will tell the jury that it should not worry
about taxes the plaintiff may be required to pay on the award. On
the other hand the court, even if asked to do so by counsel, will not
tell the jury that the plaintiff will not be required to pay taxes. As-
suming that juries are conscious of taxes and believe, if erroneously,
that plaintiffs will be compelled to pay them, the effect of these rulings
appear to favor plaintiffs. Some juries may add a sum to the verdict so
that their awards will not be diminished by taxes; but, absent specific
advice that the award will not be diminished it seems highly unlikely
that they will reduce the award.
It is understandable that neither pensions nor Workmen's Com-
pensation should be factors reducing the size of verdicts. The principle
that a tortfeasor's duty to respond in damages is not to be mitigated by
such other arrangements as his victim may have made or by such
benefits as the law provides is sound, entrenched, and no longer chal-
lenged. Less clear is a principle recently reiterated or perhaps enlarged,
in Helmick v. Netzley.30 The widow had remarried before trial. At pre-
trial, the court sustained her motion that she be sworn and identified
throughout the trial by her former name, that is, as the wife of the
decedent. Counsel for the defendant was admonished not to refer to
her by her present name nor in any way to indicate her remarriage. The
court noted that remarriage is not admissible in diminution of damages,
and this rule would be subverted if the jury knew the truth. The de-
cision is an extension of earlier rulings on the same point. While there
is no doubt that the jury should be instructed on the immateriality of
her marital status, its deliberate and planned concealment seems to re-
flect adversely on the intelligence of jurors and their commitment to
follow the court's instructions of law. In any event, the case is a further
example of the trend in cases of this sort.
In cases where the decedent was the chief support of the family,
and, in particular, where he was a father, juries and courts may and do
28 Id. at 285, 135 N.E. 2d 257.
29 Ibid.
s0 12 Ohio Misc. 97, 40 Ohio Op. 2d 104, 229 N.E. 2d 476 (1967).
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recognize factors other than earnings in calculating pecuniary loss. It
is obvious that a father's counsel, guidance, and protection are of pecu-
niary value and that children deprived of these benefits may very well
have suffered an actual and demonstrable financial loss.
Certain general conclusions may be drawn from an overview of
wrongful death case damage trends. First, verdicts in this phase of tort
law are rising although probably not so high nor so fast as in personal
injury cases not involving death. Although judicial interpretation of
damage limitations are clearly more liberal, the statute must still be
reckoned with and continues to depress verdicts to some extent. The
time may come when the General Assembly will see fit to accord the
same recognition to the mental suffering that follows upon the death
of a member of the family as the law now does to the pain and suffering
which are sequels to physical injury. Should that happen, evidence of
pecuniary injury, in many cases, will be introduced merely as "specials,"
the true substance of the damage claim being the grief caused by the
death of the loved one. The evidentiary problems that would ensue are
fearsome to contemplate, but similar problems have been met and over-
come in ordinary personal injury suits. For the present, the old saw
that it is often cheaper for the tort feasor to kill his victim than to maim
him remains substantially true.
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